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Abstract: This paper concerns constitutional review of legislation, a widely discussed issue within 
comparative constitutional law. Specifically, this paper addresses the issue of the lack of democratic 
legitimacy that U.S. style judicial review has and the potential lack of stability that other weak form 
constitutional review mechanisms have. Three constitutional review procedures are proposed in this paper, 
with the commonly overlooked executive branch playing a central role in each review mechanism. These 
proposed procedures aim to solve democratic legitimacy and stability issues. While all three arguably 
accomplish the mentioned goal, the paper addresses the issues each proposed mechanism has before 
defending the leading mechanism. The paper offers a possible solution to the seemingly unresolvable 
tension within constitutional review of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy. The described 
mechanisms and the outcomes they produce seems to show that democratically based constitutional review 
is possible and it is not necessary to rely on unelected judges to ensure that constitutional rights are 
maintained. Ultimately, this paper aims to show that a redistribution of constitutional review power among 
all state organs is the best way to ensure that legislation conforms to constitutional norms. 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
“We the People.” One of the most emotion evoking and potentially over used statements 
has found its way to the center of many democracy-based arguments in constitutional 
analysis. But if the ‘people’ are center to democracy and the social contract that 
democracy constructs, then how is it that their voice has become irrelevant? This paper 
explores different methods of constitutional review, with an attempt to find a more 
democratically legitimate decision making process. It asks whether the executive branch 
of government should be given the task of determining the consistency of legislation with 
constitutional norms, including a bill of rights. Ultimately this paper argues that the 
underutilized organ of the executive can be employed to legitimise and solve many of the 
issues surrounding the constitutional review power that currently lies with the courts. 
 
The paper begins by explaining the type of decision-making process referred to as 
‘constitutional review’ and discusses the potential lack of democratic legitimacy that this 
process can have. The paper then discusses how commentators who oppose judicial 
review rely on ideas of parliamentary supremacy or ‘weak form’ constitutional review to 
try answer judicial review critiques. By examining three types of weak form 
constitutional review, we see that these processes have democratic legitimacy but have 
potential stability issues, seen by examples in the UK and Canada. The paper moves on to 
introduce the executive branch and argues that this body has an equal mandate in the 
constitutional review process before presenting potential executive based constitutional 
review procedures.  
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The paper proposes three review mechanisms. Firstly, an executive override of judicial 
decisions, where the executive branch can return a piece of legislation that has been 
struck down to legal effectiveness. Secondly, a veto of constitutionally consequential 
legislation, where the executive can render a piece of legislation legally ineffective, 
coupled with an inability for a legislative override. Lastly, an executive mandate for 
judicial intervention, where the executive informs the judiciary which pieces of 
legislation can potentially be struck down. The paper expands of these descriptions, 
discussing potential problems that these methods face before finally defending one 
decision-making process. By this, the paper aims to satisfactorily create a stable and 
democratically legitimate constitutional review procedure.  
 
II Constitutional Review and Democratic Legitimacy 
 
Constitutional review is the inquiry and decision of whether a piece of legislation is 
consistent with a country’s constitutional norms. For the purposes of this paper, 
constitutional review should be understood as this wide meaning, completely excluding 
the body or method in which the inquiry and decision is arrived at. However, judicial 
review for the purposes of this paper should be understood slightly differently. Judicial 
review, which will be mentioned frequently, refers to the ‘strong form’ judicial review 
described by Mark Tushnet and as seen in the US. According to Tushnet, strong form 
judicial review is where the courts have general authority to determine the meaning of the 
constitution and more importantly, the courts’ constitutional interpretations are 
authoritative and binding on the other branches of government.1  In the absence of a 
constitutional amendment, the court’s decision is final in the case of judicial review; 
legislation can be declared invalid and ‘struck down’ by the courts. This paper will 
mainly be focusing on the issues surrounding this type of judicial review.  
 
It is said that judicial review requires at least three conditions for it to function within a 
constitutional system:2  
 
(1) It requires the existence of a written constitution, which is conceived as a superior 
and fundamental law with clear supremacy over other laws; 
  
1 Mark V. Tushnet “Alternative Forms of Judicial Review” (2005) 101 Georgetown Law Faculty 
Publications and Other Works 2781 at 2784. 
2 Danielle E. Finck “Judicial Review: The United States Supreme Court Versus the German Constitutional 
Court” (1997) 20 B.C Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 123 at 125.  
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(2) The constitution must be of a rigid character; the amendments or reforms that may 
be introduced can only be put into practice by means of a particular process3; and 
(3) The constitution must establish the judicial means for guaranteeing its supremacy 
over legislative acts. 
 
When a country has all three of these conditions satisfied, judicial review of legislation 
obtains the highest amount of legal supremacy and judges, as agents of the judiciary, 
obtain the highest amount of constitutional power. Of course any appropriately enacted 
constitutional amendment that alters the above conditions will have the potential to 
change or strip the judge’s power, but in the absence of such a constitutional amendment, 
the judiciary is supreme.  
 
This power given to the courts, of the judicial review of legislation, involves a group of 
people who seemingly enjoy no political legitimacy and certainly no democratic 
legitimacy to impose their preferences on citizens generally.4 The judiciary’s decisions 
work to thwart policies of the democratic branches of government.5 The individuals who 
strike down the legislation are both unelected and unaccountable. What they are 
effectively doing is invalidating democratically adopted laws.6 The question must be 
asked of how this role can be justified in a system that is based on the view that policy 
and value choices are for the elected and politically responsible institutions.7  
 
Jeremy Waldron has looked closely at the above stated question, undertaking an analysis 
of the democratic legitimacy of judicial review. Prior to his inquiry, he creates context. 
Waldron describes the type of society in which his examination operates within. His 
assumptions are, firstly, that the society has democratic institutions in reasonably working 
order, including a representative legislature elected in the basis of universal adult 
suffrage.8 Secondly, that there is a set of judicial institutions, again, in reasonably good 
working order, set up on a non-representative basis to hear individual lawsuits, settle 
disputes and uphold the rule of law.9 Thirdly, that there is a commitment on the part of 
  
3 This particular process is more difficult than the one used for the adoption of ordinary legislation. For 
example, the process may require 75% of the available votes rather than a simple 50% majority.  
4 Daniel Markovits “Democratic Disobedience” (2004-2005) 114 Yale L.J. 1897 at 1929. 
5 At 1929. 
6 At 1929. 
7 D. J. Galligan “Judicial Review and Democratic Principles: Two Theories” in Mark Tushnet Bill of Rights 
(Ashgate, Hampshire, 2007) 37 at 37. 
8 Jeremy Waldron “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346 at 1360. 
9 At 1360. 
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most members of the society and most of its officials to individual and minority rights.10 
Lastly, that there exists persisting, substantial and good faith disagreement about rights 
among members of the society who are committed to the idea of rights.11 This paper 
relies on these assumptions and other assumptions that will be described later.   
 
Democratic legitimacy is a term that needs explanation. It can be best understood by the 
example where Waldron discusses majority decisions. A person disagreeing with a 
decision may ask why they should be bound or burdened by the decision.12 The decision 
can be ‘legitimised’ through the process in which it was arrived at, meaning that a person 
who disagrees with the outcome of the decision can still accept the decision due to the 
legitimate means in which it was reached.13 A democratic decision, reached by a majority 
can be said to be more legitimate than an undemocratic decision. Waldron explains why 
this is so.  
 
A citizen may ask why a group of people (the legislature) should have the right to decide 
a question of rights affecting them. Assuming elections to the legislature are fair, then the 
legislature is made up of people who were all treated equal to their fellow citizens in 
determining who should be privileged to make up the legislature.14 The people within the 
legislature are there due to winning a majority vote. Therefore, the legislature’s decision, 
which is made by a majority of the legislature, is in theory a reasonable approximation of 
the decision that would be reached by the majority of citizens as a whole.15 So in fact, 
what we say is that even though the decision that affects the rights of an individual is 
made by the legislature, the process through which that decision is made, to a certain 
extent, lets all individuals make a decision on the matter. It is this process which makes 
the democratic decisions legitimate.  
 
Contrary to this, Waldron looks at a decision involving rights that is made by the courts. 
Again, a citizen who disagrees in substance about a decision affecting her rights may ask 
why a small group of unelected men or women may determine this matter.16 A possible 
answer to this is that the judges are appointed by democratically elected decision makers 
  
10 Waldron “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review”, above n 8, at 1360. 
11 At 1360. 
12 At 1387. 
13 At 1387. 
14 At 1387. 
15 At 1387. 
16 At 1390. 
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or decision making bodies (such as a president or a legislature).17 Because appointment 
stems from a democratically elected decision maker, the trickle through of democratic 
principles reaches the judges in a way to legitimise the process. But if legitimacy of 
process is a comparative matter, then the system of legislative decision-making must be 
superior. Although in reality the system of legislative elections and decisions is not 
perfect, it is evidently more superior as a matter of democracy and democratic values than 
the indirect and limited basis of democracy that the judiciary can be said to have.18 
Legislators are at all times accountable to their constituents and their behavior is 
representative of the electoral credentials that were put forward and agreed with by the 
majority of voters when the voters accepted that person into the participation of political 
decision making.19 This is not true for judges. They are not accountable to any person or 
entity, and it is this factor within the judicial decision making process which can be said 
to place the nail in the coffin for any type of pretended democratic legitimacy that a 
judiciary can be said to have. 
 
Based on Waldron’s explanation of democratic legitimacy and the examples he gives, it 
is fairly clear that a decision affecting individual’s rights which is made by the judicial 
branch of government has little legitimacy when compared to a decision made by a 
democratic and representative branch of government. If this is the case, then how have 
commentators responded to issues relating to judicial review of legislation? 
 
III Parliamentary Sovereignty and Weak Form Judicial Review  
 
When constitutional review takes place, what we have are members of a society 
disagreeing about whether a piece of legislation violates an individual’s rights.20 We have 
one party saying that, in their opinion, legislation has infringed their constitutionally 
entrenched rights, whereas another party is saying, in their opinion, that the legislation 
does not restrict constitutional rights. In the case of potentially ambiguous legislation, this 
disagreement is completely reasonable and will need resolving. Judicial review of 
legislation is one method of resolving this disagreement. However, as explained above, 
this decision making process can be said to lack democratic legitimacy. What is needed is 
a decision making procedure in which members of society can agree with the legitimacy 
of the decision making process, even when they disagree about rights or the outcomes 
  
17 Waldron “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review”, above n 8, at 1391. 
18 At 1391. 
19 At 1391 
20 At 1371. 
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that the decision making process produces. Commentators addressing judicial review of 
legislation have suggested other methods of resolving constitutional disagreements that 
are potentially more democratically legitimate and which leave the final say of a statute’s 
compliance with constitutional norms in the hands of the legislature. 
 
What Tushnet refers to as “weak form” judicial review is a method of constitutional 
review that reduces the tension between judicial review and democratic self-governance, 
while acknowledging that constitutionalism requires some limits on self-governance.21 
What this means is that weak form review methods act as a check on legislation, giving 
an opinion as to whether the statute is compliant with constitutional norms. The weak 
form process acts as a qualified limit on Parliament’s sovereignty. It attempts to keep the 
legislative branch inside their constitutional limits by creating pressure on the legislature 
to make statutes that conform to constitutional norms. However, what differs with weak 
form review is that the opinion expressed as to the constitutionality of legislation can 
always be subjugated by the opinion of parliament, who has the final say in a 
disagreement about legislation’s constitutionality. It is this aspect of the mechanism that 
creates democratic legitimacy. Tushnet explains three differing types of weak form 
judicial review procedures. 
 
A Interpretive Mandate 
 
A ‘pure interpretive mandate’ centers on a statutory bill of rights that is not entrenched 
and is not supreme law.22 The process can be best understood by looking at the specifics 
of the procedure in place in New Zealand. The Bill of Rights Act 1990 is an ordinary 
statute, which in theory could be repealed by a majority at any time.23 It lists a number of 
fundamental individual rights, but what is important is that these rights are not directly 
enforceable. The act does not let the courts hold legislation as invalid due to a violation of 
a substantive right.24 Instead, where a piece of legislation can be given a meaning 
  
21 Mark Tushnet Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (1st ed, Princeton University Press, Oxfordshire, 2008) at 23. 
22 Mark Tushnet “The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review” in Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg (eds) 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011) at 323. 
23 Tushnet Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, above n 21, at 25.  
24 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4.  
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consistent with the rights and freedoms listed in the act, then that meaning must be 
preferred to any other meaning.25 
 
How then can this be seen as a weak form of constitutional review? Tushnet explains. 
When determining what a statutory provision means, a judge begins by using ordinary 
tools of statutory interpretation, such as the statue’s purpose, its legislative history, 
various cannons of statutory interpretation and so on.26 Two possible scenarios can occur. 
A judge can discover when using the interpretive tools that some tools lead towards a 
rights protective interpretation and some lead towards a rights restrictive interpretation. 
Due to the Bill of Rights Act, the interpretive mandate requires the judge to adopt the 
rights protective mandate.27 The second scenario is where nearly all of the interpretive 
tools point toward the rights restrictive interpretation.28 Here is where the clarity of the 
interpretive mandate as a weak form of judicial review can be seen. Even though 
parliament has made it reasonably clear as to what their intentions of the statute are, the 
fact that is it possible to interpret the statute in a more rights protective way will trump 
the statute’s relatively clear purpose. Here, the possible disagreement of the meaning of a 
statute will result in courts accepting the most rights friendly and constitutional meaning. 
The fundamental assumption behind weak form judicial review is a reasonable 
disagreement over the meaning of constitutional provisions. As long as a reasonable 
rights protective interpretation is possible, this is how the disagreement will prima facie 
be decided.  
 
Let’s say the legislature disagrees with the courts rights protective interpretation. 
Although it was reasonably possible for the courts to interpret the statute the way they 
did, let’s say it was not how the legislature intended the statute to be read and as a result, 
the policy that was trying to be put in place has been limited. How then can this conflict 
be solved? This is where parliamentary sovereignty is seen, the second fundamental 
aspect of weak form judicial review. A majority in parliament can pass a new piece of 
legislation, directing the courts as to how to interpret the previously impugned statute. By 
closing the loophole for a possible interpretation and by instructing the courts as to the 
  
25 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6.  
26 Tushnet Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, above n 21, at 25. 
27 At 25. 
28 Tushnet Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, above n 21, at 25-26. 
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exact interpretation intended by parliament, the legislature always has the legal power to 
end the constitutional disagreement with its own full and final opinion.  
 
B Augmented Interpretive Mandate 
 
What Tushnet refers to as an ‘augmented interpretive mandate’ is the current weak form 
judicial review process that exists in the UK. Basically, it is the same as the New Zealand 
form of interpretive mandate, with some extra powers held by other government organs. 
The Human Rights Act 199829 (HRA) directs the courts to interpret a statute to be 
consistent with fundamental rights, just as the pure interpretive mandate does. However, 
it also give the courts an increased power to declare statutes incompatible with rights 
stated in the HRA if the courts are unable to interpret legislation in a rights protective 
manner.30 This declaration does not strike down the statute; in fact, it does not have any 
effects on an individual’s legal rights.31 What the declaration can do is fast track an 
amendment process for the impugned legislation, bypassing some of the ordinary 
procedural obstacles.32  
 
This process acts as a weak form of judicial review for all the reasons that a pure 
interpretive mandate does. It attempts to view legislation in the most constitutionally 
friendly manner, but also makes an official statement to parliament and the country’s 
citizens when a piece of legislation cannot be interpreted in line with constitutional rights. 
The declaration states unequivocally that the judiciary disagrees with parliament as to the 
constitutionality of a piece of legislation. Importantly however, while this may create 
social and political pressure that parliament must respond to, it does not create any legal 
consequence that parliament must respond to. Although the judiciary has a disagreement 
about a piece of legislation’s conformity with constitutional norms, its opinion is legally 
trumped by parliament. 
 
 
 
  
29 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
30 Human Right Act 1998 (UK) , s 4. 
31 Tushnet Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, above n 21, at 28. 
32 At 28. 
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C A “Dialogic” Mode of Review  
 
The last weak form judicial review process stems from the Canadian Charter of Rights.33 
This form of review gives power to the court to suspend the legal effect of legislation of a 
statute pending a legislative response through ordinary legislation.34 Peter Hogg refers to 
this type of review as “dialogic” due to the constitutional dialogue that it arguably creates 
between the judicial and legislative branches of government.35  
 
Section 33 of the Charter provides that the Canadian legislature can make statutes 
effective, for renewable five-year periods, “notwithstanding” their inconsistency with a 
large number of important charter provisions as interpreted by the court.36 Rights such as 
the freedom of religion, expression, peaceful assembly, life, liberty and justice can all be 
subjugated if legislation is passed and section 33 is employed to protect the statute’s 
effectiveness notwithstanding a court interpreted charter breach.37 There are rights 
enshrined in the Charter which section 33 cannot apply to, namely democratic rights such 
as the right to vote and the length of parliament.38 This type of constitutional review and 
its underlying democratic compliance can be explained best with an example. Say a 
legislature believes, in their opinion, a bill conforms to constitutional principles and it 
passes it into legislation. The judiciary has a case before them questioning the 
constitutionality of the piece of legislation and deems it, in their opinion, 
unconstitutional. What we then have is a classic disagreement between the courts and the 
legislature about the constitutionality of legislation. With the courts judgment, the 
impugned statute becomes ineffective, exactly as would occur in the US. However, the 
legislature is able to pass an ordinary piece of legislation by a simple majority to override 
the court’s decision and make the impugned legislation effective “notwithstanding” the 
court’s opinion as to its unconstitutionality. Over all, the process is one that maximises 
judicial scrutiny of legislation while still ultimately bowing to democracy. 
 
  
33 Canada Act 1982 (UK) ch 11, sch B pt I (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’). 
34 Tushnet “The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review”, above n 22, at 325. 
35 Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures: (Or 
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 OHLJ 75 at 79-81.  
36 Tushnet Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, above n 21, at 31-32. 
37 Canada Act 1982 (UK) ch 11, sch B pt I (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’) s 33(1). 
38 Above. 
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D Conclusions 
 
US style judicial review can be said to be unsatisfactory due to the lack of democratic 
legitimacy. A search for a more democratic process is the entire purpose of this paper. At 
this point then, hasn’t the issue been solved by the above described constitutional review 
methods of New Zealand, the UK and Canada? Do these methods not fix the legitimacy 
issue? As explained below, these methods of review, whilst prima facie solving the 
democratic legitimacy issues, are potentially unstable and may lead to either degeneration 
into absolute parliamentary sovereignty or the evolution into effective strong form review 
over time.  
 
IV Degeneration and Evolution of Weak Form Review 
 
Sustaining a weak form constitutional review process has been said to be a potentially 
difficult thing to accomplish.39 This difficulty can be explained by looking closer at the 
above term. A weak form constitutional process is deliberately weaker than strong form 
review, with the judiciary lacking the final say on constitutional disagreements. However, 
it is still a process that inquires into the constitutionality of legislation. The problem is 
that a mechanism may, eventually, evolve into a process which no longer resembles a 
weak form, or conversely, become so weak that is fails as a constitutional review function 
entirely. 
 
A Evolution into Effective Strong Form Review 
 
A weak form system might exist in theory, but in reality operate as a strong form of 
constitutional review. Such an occurrence would happen when legislatures do not 
respond to interpretive expansions by the courts or when legislatures routinely adopt 
judicial proposals to changes in legislation.40 Even though the final legal power lies with 
the legislature due to the structure of the weak form mechanisms, in effect, the 
legislature’s acceptance of the court’s ruling on constitutional issues can be said not to be 
a form of ‘judicial dialogue’, but instead an acceptance of judicial supremacy in 
constitutional disagreements. Even though the legislature has the potential to have the 
final say as to the constitutionality of a piece of legislation, the fact that it doesn’t use this 
power could be construed as deference to the judiciary and an acceptance of their 
  
39 Tushnet “The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review”, above n 22, at 330. 
40 At 330. 
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supremacy. This potential problem with weak form judicial review, being that it has the 
potential to evolve into effective strong form review, can be seen through experiences in 
Canada and the UK. 
 
1 Canada 
 
The federal government of Canada has never invoked the notwithstanding clause.41 Such 
a clause has fallen into desuetude, discredited by its use in Quebec and by threats of use 
that were never effectively carried out.42 Of the mere 16 times the notwithstanding clause 
has been invoked, 13 of these were in Quebec and were done without public 
involvement.43 There seems to be no evidence of any public debate occurring over these 
13 acts, conversely, the public basically ignored the section’s use.44 In all cases but one,45 
section 33 has been used preemptively and not as a response to judicial striking down of 
legislation.46 In response to these points, Snow raises a very interesting question, 
asking:47  
 
“If the notwithstanding clause remains a legitimate constitutional instrument, why 
has it been used so infrequently? In particular, why has it not been used to response 
to a court ruling with which the government disagrees?” 
 
Asking Snow’s question in a slightly different way, can it be that the federal legislature of 
Canada has never disagreed with the constitutional interpretations of the Courts? Surely 
this cannot be the case. It would be a difficult argument to make that the legislature 
reasonably believed that all of the statutes that have been subsequently struck down by 
the Supreme Court of Canada were unconstitutional.  A more reasonable answer to why 
the federal legislature has not used section 33 in response to court’s rulings is because the 
legislature is deferring to the judiciary in cases of constitutional disagreement. A stronger 
  
41 David Snow “Notwithstanding the Override: Path Dependence, Section 33 and the Charter” 2008-2009 8 
Inovations: A Journal of Politics 1 at 1. 
42 Tushnet “The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review”, above n 22, at 330. 
43 David Snow “Notwithstanding the Override: Path Dependence, Section 33 and the Charter”, above n 41, 
at 3. 
44 Tsvi Kahana "The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from the Ignored 
Practice of Section 33 of the Charter" (2001) 44-3 Canadian Public Administration 255 at 259-260. 
45 See Ford v Quebec (Attorney General) (1988) 2 (SCR) and Bill 178. 
46 David Snow “Notwithstanding the Override: Path Dependence, Section 33 and the Charter”, above n 41, 
at 3. 
47 At 4. 
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way of saying this is that the legislature is accepting the supremacy of the courts in 
regards to whether legislation complies with constitutional norms. While the legislature 
has the power of the final say, the fact that it never uses it cannot be overlooked. What is 
equally important in a constitutional review process is the reality of the process and not 
merely the design. Perhaps the answer to this non-use is that the legislature is reserving 
the power for exceptional circumstances, such as when a judiciary is clearly trying to 
impose their ideology on the legislature. Returning to the assumptions of Waldron 
however, the judicial system is assumed to be in good working order with judges existing 
to reach an impartial decision on a legal dispute. Assuming this is what exits in Canada, it 
is unlikely that the judges would attempt to impose their particular ideologies through 
judicial decisions. What is arguably more likely, from the proven lack of use of the 
notwithstanding clause, is an acceptance of judicial supremacy.  
 
Arguably, while the legal system in Canada is one where parliament has supremacy, the 
effective system is one where the judiciary has supremacy. If the effective system gives 
the judiciary the final word of constitutional disagreements, then this looks much more 
like a strong form of judicial review, rather than the weak form that Canada supposedly 
has. This shows, in practice, the potential issue that weak form judicial review has; its 
potential to evolve into effective strong form review and undermine the democratic 
principles in which weak form review is founded upon. 
 
2 UK 
 
The issue of weak form evolution into effective strong form review can also be seen in 
examples from the UK. The government in the UK has routinely modified legislation in 
response to declarations of incompatibility.48 Of the 19 declarations of incompatibility 
that have been made and become final, 18 have been remedied by either changes to 
primary legislation or remedied by a remedial order.49 What this means is that the UK 
parliament is adopting the opinion of the courts in cases of constitutional disagreement 
and arguably rubber-stamping the judiciary’s decisions. The acceptances of the court’s 
decisions have been described as being done “grudgingly”,50 implying that the legislature 
  
48 Tushnet “The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review”, above n 22, at 331. 
49 Ministry of Justice (UK) Responding to Human Rights Judgments: Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government Response to Human Rights Judgments 2011-12 (September 2012) at 40.  
50 Tushnet “The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review”, above n 22, at 331. 
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may have some reservations about the court’s constitutional interpretations, but still 
accepts them despite these reservations. 
 
It is worth noting the court’s interpretive mandate that exists along side the court’s 
declaration of incompatibility power. While parliament arguably adopts the court’s 
constitutional opinion from declarations of inconsistency, more difficult is the question of 
how it responds to rights friendly interpretations of the courts. Where parliament passes 
legislation to override the rights friendly interpretation the court has used for a specific 
piece of legislation, then parliament cannot be said to be adopting the courts opinion of 
legislation’s constitutional compliance. The issue is that it is unclear the extent to which 
this happens, while it is easily observable that parliament is adopting the court’s opinion 
in cases of declarations of inconsistency. One would expect that if a legislature were 
agreeing with the courts opinion as to constitutional rights violations in cases of 
declarations of inconsistency, that it would not then act in a way that limits constitutional 
rights through the narrowing of judge’s interpretive abilities. It is odd to suggest that 
parliament would use one constitutional review instrument to routinely implement the 
courts opinion and use the other instrument to override the courts opinion. More likely is 
that parliament accepts the declarations of inconsistency; changing legislation is response 
and allows the unrestricted use of the interpretive mandate.  
 
If a legislature always accepts the court’s final interpretation on constitutional 
disagreements and passes legislation to make the court’s opinion the effective legal 
response to the constitutional disagreement, can this be said to be the legislature having 
the final say? The definition of rubber stamp is to, “endorse or approve uncritically; pass 
routinely or automatically.”51 This definition sounds suspiciously like what the UK 
parliament is doing with constitutional rights infringements. While it cannot be said that 
parliament has had no input into constitutional review decisions, due to the fact that it has 
ignored one declaration of inconsistency, what is apparent is that the courts opinion has 
been drastically more influential. The adoption of 18 out of 19 declarations of 
inconsistency cannot simply be overlooked and indicates that the court’s opinion is in 
almost all occasions the one that is followed when legislation’s constitutional compliance 
is at issue. To claim that the judiciary has had the final effective say in a constitutional 
disagreement would require parliament to adopt the exact critiques of the courts when 
amending the impugned statutes, which is not the case. But the fact that amendments are 
made, based on the courts suggestions, suggests that the final decision making of 
  
51 Lesley Brown The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) 
Volume 2 at 2641. 
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constitutional disagreements is being made by both parliament and the courts, but with 
the courts opinion having an arguably larger weight.  
 
What this means is that, while parliament has absolute legal sovereignty, the effective 
nature of how the procedure operates seems to have strong form review characteristics. 
Unelected judges have a much larger say in the final result of whether a piece of 
legislation is constitutionally compliant and this seem resemble strong form review rather 
than a democratically compliant weak form system. While the UK evolution into strong 
form review can be said to be less than what has occurred in Canada, it again shows the 
potential for weak form review mechanisms to evolve into effective strong form 
mechanisms, seen by the reality of how the system works rather than merely looking at 
the nuts and bolts of the mechanisms make up.   
 
B Degeneration into Absolute Parliamentary Sovereignty 
 
Of equal concern with weak form judicial review processes is the potential for the 
process to degenerate into a system of absolute parliamentary sovereignty where, in 
effect, no review of the constitutionality of legislation takes place. Such a system can be 
explained by looking at the opposite situations of what has occurred in Canada, the UK 
and also by looking at New Zealand.  
 
The Canadian notwithstanding clause is rarely ever used, but an equally concerning 
situation would arise if it was routinely used. Imagine a situation where every piece of 
legislation passed by the federal legislature had the preemptive protection of section 33. 
What this would do is strip any ability the courts have to give their opinion as to the 
constitutionality of legislation and as a result, there would be no effective constitutional 
review of legislation. The argument could be made as to why this would be a bad thing. 
Isn’t the point of this paper an attempt to promote democratic principles? If a majority 
states that the piece of legislation should have the protection of the notwithstanding 
clause then surely this falls into the realm of the democratic principles that this paper is 
promoting. The above is true, but must be qualified. Equally important to democratic 
principles is that democratic constitutional review actually takes place. By eliminating 
any form of review whatsoever, the weak form mechanism fails completely and slips into 
absolute parliamentary sovereignty. While the use of the notwithstanding clause in and of 
itself does not deserve to be condemned, the consistent use of it to effectively undermine 
17  300163164 
 
any form of judicially based constitutional review shows a potential issue with weak form 
review.  
 
While it is arguable that the use of section 33 could be seen as parliament engaging in a 
form of constitutional review itself, constitutional review by the legislature of its own 
legislation is indistinguishable from parliamentary sovereignty. There is no way to 
determine whether parliament is saying, “this piece of legislation is constitutionally 
compliant” or whether parliament is saying, “we are a sovereign legislature and are 
protecting the effectiveness of this legislation regardless of its constitutional compliance.” 
Instead of answering the question of whether legislation is constitutionally complaint, the 
use of the notwithstanding clause could equally be parliament ignoring the question 
entirely and merely expressing its sovereignty. There is no way to determine what 
parliament is stating by its use of the notwithstanding clause, and therefore there is no 
way to state with confidence that an engagement of section 33 involves any constitutional 
review. This would mean that the consistent use of the notwithstanding clause could lead 
to degeneration into parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
The same issue can be seen if the opposite of the UK situation existed. If out of the 19 
declarations of incompatibility, 0 had had any legislative response then it is arguable that 
no constitutional review function has occurred. In addition, if the legislature consistently 
overrode rights friendly interpretations reached under the interpretive mandate then it is 
again arguable that no review function has occurred. By the legislature effectively 
ignoring every opinion the court has issued as to the constitutionality of legislation, what 
parliament is arguably saying is that, “all the legislation that we have passed is 
constitutionally compliant and the opinion of the courts is irrelevant, does not and will 
not affect our opinion.”  By ignoring or overriding the courts, the court’s opinion 
becomes redundant and the overall system of constitutional review fails, degenerating 
into absolute parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
The same situation as described above has the potential to occur in New Zealand. There, 
the legislature might consistently override rights friendly interpretations reached by the 
judiciary under the interpretive mandate. If the procedure that allows judges to interpret 
legislation in line with constitutional norms is constantly subjugated to parliament’s 
interpretive instructions, then what exists can hardly be called a constitutional review 
process, but rather mere parliamentary sovereignty.  
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The three situations described above have not occurred and are unlikely to occur due to 
political forces. A parliament who constantly overrode or ignored issues relating 
constitutional rights would not likely keep the confidence of the citizens. However, if the 
constitutional rights issues only affected minorities, then majorities might not care, or 
they might in fact agree with the effective lack of constitutional review. The result would 
be democratic, but more importantly, would destroy any constitutional review function 
the system had. 
 
C Conclusions on Weak Form Review 
 
At this point, the paper has discussed the need for democratic legitimacy in a 
constitutional review function and has pointed out that strong form US style judicial 
review lacks legitimacy. By looking closely at various weak form review mechanisms, it 
is evident that while these processes maintain democratic legitimacy in theory, they have 
the potential to degenerate into absolute parliamentary sovereignty or evolve into 
effective strong form review. After viewing weak form review it is clear the issue has 
then evolved. The issue has now become creation of a democratic constitutional review 
function that cannot degenerate into parliamentary sovereignty or evolve into effect 
strong form review.  
 
V The Executive 
 
Before dealing with the above stated issue, it is worth pausing and noting a significantly 
overlooked entity in constitutional review discussion, the executive branch of 
government. This branch often plays little or no part in a disagreement about a piece of 
legislation’s constitutionality and is said to have been subject to long term neglect in 
constitutional theory.52 Why is this so?  
 
The executive branch of government is democratic. In a Westminster style system, when 
a political party has the confidence of the House of Representatives, then the leader of 
that political party is sworn is as Prime Minister. Simply put, the leader of the political 
party that makes up the majority of the legislature becomes the head of the executive 
branch. Due to that person having the confidence of the majority of the house, their 
appointment is democratic. This democratic legitimacy flows to the rest of the executive 
  
52 Terence Daintith and Alan Page The Executive in the Constitution – Structure, Autonomy and Internal 
Control ( 1st ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) at 10. 
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government. The executive branch of government in a US style system is equally 
democratic. In this type of system, citizens vote for their choice of President, who is both 
the head of state and head of the executive branch of government. Citizens cast their 
individual votes. These votes decide what presidential candidate the specific states will 
support. Then, the Electoral College, which is made up of a proportionate number of 
electors to population per state cast their votes to determine who becomes the president.53 
Individual citizens votes are indirect, but still result in a democratic election of the 
president and executive branch of government. 
 
If the executive branch of government is elected democratically, then any decisions that 
they make in theory should have democratic legitimacy. The traditional position of the 
executive is that it is supposed to be the branch that merely enforces laws and puts laws 
into effect.54 According to Montesquieu, and his views on the separation of powers, the 
executive branch should not make laws or settle legal disputes.55 However this closed-
minded and overly theoretical description ignores what modern executives actually do. 
Modern executives do make law and settle disputes. Taking New Zealand as an example, 
Ministers and their delegates create and implement regulations frequently. While an Act 
is created by parliament, the executive branch creates the policies and procedures.56 
Through power devolved to ministers from parliament, members of the executive 
routinely create legally binding policies. Also, the executive provides administrative 
tribunals and authorities that act to settle legal disputes.57 Expert members of the 
executive branch use their knowledge and dispute resolution abilities to reach justified 
and binding decisions on legal disagreements. Further from this, executives have shown 
expertise in reviewing and criticising current and future pieces of legislation. Crown 
entities, such as the New Zealand Law Commission are consistently providing reports 
critical of current legislation and bills.58  
 
  
53 US Electoral College “What is the Electoral College” < http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/about.html>. 
54 John Adler Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th ed, Palgrave Macmillan, East Kilbride, 2011) at 
137. 
55 At 137. 
56 See for example Social Security Act 1964 and Work and Income Policy and Procedures. 
57 Ministry of Justice “Tribunals” < http://www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals>. List includes, but is not limited 
to: Accident Compensation Appeals Authority, Alcohol Regulatory and Licensing Authority, Copyright 
Tribunal, Customs Appeal Authority, Human Rights Review Tribunal, Lawyers and Conveyancers 
Disciplinary Tribunal, Real Estate Agents Disciplinary Tribunal and Social Security Appeal Authority. 
58 The Law Commission has produced 121 reports critical of legislation. 
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If an executive is democratically legitimate, practices legislation creation, has experience 
in dispute settlement and has expertise in the review and critical analysis of legislation, 
then the issue is raised again as to why it should take no part in the review of legislation’s 
constitutionality. The above facts seem to suggest that the executive branch of 
government has just as much expertise and an equal mandate to be involved in the review 
process of legislation. In fact, countries such as New Zealand, Sweden and Japan already 
involve the executive in the constitutional review process. Executive institutions in these 
countries screen legislative proposals before they are submitted for legislative 
consideration in an attempt to ensure constitutional compliance.59  The skills required and 
reasons for constitutional review seem to fit squarely into the modern day reality of what 
role an executive branch of government performs. Central to this paper is the assumption 
that the executive is equally justified in taking part in constitutional review and the paper 
will now make a number of proposals in which the executive plays a central role in 
constitutional review.   
 
 
VI Potential Institutionalisations of the Constitutional Review Process 
 
The paper now moves on to look at three potential constitutional review models, which 
attempt to tackle the issue at hand. All three processes are new mechanisms or 
adaptations of existing constitutional review mechanisms that strive towards a review 
function that is democratically legitimate and stable in the long term. These three 
methods can be described briefly as an executive override of judicial decisions, an 
absolute veto of constitutionally consequential legislation and an executive mandate for 
judicial intervention. 
 
A Executive Override of Judicial Decisions 
 
The first of the potential constitutional review models is an adaptation of the US 
presidential veto power. To provide a better understanding of this potential constitutional 
review process, it is helpful to firstly understand the veto power, as it currently exists. 
Within the US Constitution is the power of the President to veto a piece of legislation 
passed by congress.60 Whilst the constitution states that all legislative powers shall be 
  
59 Tushnet, “The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review”, above n 22, at 322. 
60 US Constitution Art 1, § 7. 
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vested in the Congress of the United States,61 the President is able to subjugate such 
legislation making power if he or she so chooses. The qualification on this power is that 
when a president issues a regular veto, he or she returns the unsigned legislation to 
congress within 10 days, usually with reasons for the veto. Congress can then override 
the President’s decision if it can gain a two-thirds majority in each house.62  
 
Instead of focusing on a veto of legislation, as is the focus of the veto power in the US, 
the proposed constitutional review mechanism would focus on the judiciary’s decisions 
to strike down legislation. The system would exist in a similar fashion to the current US 
style judicial review. The courts would have the legal power to strike down legislation 
that, in their opinion, breaches constitutional norms. The addition to the current US 
constitutional review framework, there would be the creation of the executive power to 
veto the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a piece of legislation. Put another way, 
the executive would have the power to make legislation that the court has made 
unenforceable once again enforceable. If, in the executive’s opinion, a piece of legislation 
that was struck down does in fact comply with constitutional values, the executive would 
have the power to override the courts decision, render it void and restore the legal 
effectiveness of the impugned legislation. Although unlikely, the legislature would 
always have the power to repeal legislation that the president has returned to legal 
effectiveness if it is of the opinion that the court was correct and the legislation is not 
constitutionally compliant.  
 
There are two possible variations of this constitutional review process. The first is that the 
president, after receiving advice from cabinet and other advisors, makes the decision 
alone of whether the piece of legislation is constitutionally complaint. Under this 
variation, the democratic election process would give legitimacy to the decision. Because 
the president has the support of the majority of voters, any decision made by him or her is 
arguably legitimised by this fact. The second variation of this constitutional review 
process is that while the formal power rests in the head of the executive, it is exercised 
after a citizens initiated referendum which reaches a decision on whether a piece of 
legislation is constitutionally compliant. In this way the individual voters have a direct 
say in the constitutional compliance of legislation and the democratic result is a decision 
made by the majority of citizens. 
 
  
61 US Constitution Art 1, § 1. 
62 History, Art and Archives – United States House of Representatives “Presidential Vetoes” 
<http://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidential-Vetoes/Presidential-Vetoes/>. 
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For the above reasons, both variations are in line with democratic legitimacy. In regards 
to stability, issues relating to the non-referendum variant will be discussed in the section 
below, where the problems of the possible institutionalisations are examined. Looking at 
the referendum variant however, it is likely that the review function will remain stable. 
Evolution into strong form review is extremely unlikely. This is because the evolution 
into strong form relies on parliament, or in this case, on citizens, always agreeing with the 
decisions of the courts. It is arguable that the consistent agreement with the judiciary 
occurs because of the political costs of disagreement. Parliament might defer to the 
judiciary in every case of constitutional disagreement because presenting their own rights 
limiting opinion might cost votes and have other political effects. Using Canada as an 
example, the lack of use of section 33 can arguably be reasoned by the political cost of 
using such a mechanism. The political impact of protecting a rights limiting piece of 
legislation arguably leads parliament to always respect judicial decisions and never 
invoke such protection. However, there are no political costs for citizens when presenting 
their own opinion on legislations constitutional compliance. Because of this, there is no 
reason why a person would be inclined to always agree with the judicial decisions. It 
could be said that people trust the opinions of judges more so than legislators and that 
because of this trust they would be more likely to agree with the opinion of the courts. 
However, this point misses the crucial issue of consistent agreement. While it may be 
more likely that citizens will agree with the courts, it is unlikely that citizens will always 
agree with the courts, due to them having a completely impartial and politically costless 
choice on constitutional matters. Effective strong form exists due to consistent agreement 
with judicial decisions, but due to the referendum variant and the lack of political costs 
attached to individual citizens, it is unlikely consistent judicial agreement would occur.  
 
Furthermore degeneration into absolute parliamentary sovereignty is highly unlikely. 
This is because, in the absence of any constitutional amendment, parliament’s law 
making power is subject to the constraints of ordinary judicial review. What this means is 
that parliament is not absolutely sovereign as the judiciary has the power to strike down 
unconstitutional legislation. The executive, in theory, has the power to grant parliament 
absolute sovereignty by vetoing all judicial decisions that strike down legislation. 
However, if the referendum variant is used, it is unlikely that this will occur. The 
majority of a population is likely to have differing opinions on differing issues. It is a 
difficult argument to run that in every case of rights issues, citizens would disagree with 
the courts. Abortion, gay marriage and euthanasia are all good examples of rights issues 
in which a majority may or may not agree. The likeliness of a population disagreeing 
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with all judicial invalidations is low, and therefore so too is the likeliness of this 
constitutional mechanism degenerating into absolute parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Executive veto of judicial decisions is the first proposed method of constitutional review. 
It appears democratically legitimate regardless of which variation is used and is arguable 
that the referendum variation will be stable and not evolve or degenerate. 
 
1 Problems with Executive Override of Judicial Decisions  
 
The executive having the power to override judicial decisions of legislation being 
inconsistent with constitutional norms is not without problems. The non-referendum 
variant, where the president alone makes the decision of whether an override should 
occur, maintains the risk of evolution into effective strong form review. If the executive 
override is never used, then what is in effect happening is that the judiciary is having the 
final say on constitutional compliance of legislation. As is the case in Canada, where the 
federal legislature has the power to protect legislation from being struck down, the non-
use of this power results in effective strong form review. The risk of a case identical to 
Canada is very real, the only difference being in Canada the power lies with parliament 
and under this proposal the power lies with the executive. The risk of non-use could 
equally lead to effective strong form review.  
 
It is unlikely the above problem would exist in the referendum variant due to the fact that 
the power would not have the same type of non-use risk. As the referendum is a citizen’s 
initiated referendum, it cannot be ignored in the same way that a president or prime 
minister can ignore the result from a court decision. When a decision of the courts is 
released, the president would have a chance to respond to it under the non-referendum 
variant, but there is no direct pressure or mechanism ensuring that the president or prime 
minster has to respond. For the referendum variant, once the citizens initiates a 
referendum and gains an answer of whether the judicial decision should be overridden, 
the president or prime minister must act upon this decision. It is unlikely, but possible, 
that citizens would never initiate such a referendum and that the power is never used. 
This would result in effective strong form review. While this is a potential issue of the 
proposed mechanism, it is arguably less likely to occur under the referendum variant.              
 
Another problem that the executive override has is the specific effect that an override 
would have on an individual’s legal decision from the court. This issue would exist for 
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both variants of the proposed mechanism and can best be understood by an example. Say 
a piece of legislation allows the state to take property for one reason or another. A person 
brings a case to the judiciary saying the legislation is unconstitutional and they agree, 
giving judgment in favor of the individual, returning the property and striking down the 
legislation. The executive decides that the legislation is not unconstitutional, overrides the 
decision and returns the legislation to legal effect. The issue here is what happens to the 
individual? If their judgment is reversed, then it is clear that they cannot have their 
property returned. But the issue is bigger than this and would have systematic effects. 
Judicial confidence would be severely compromised. The incentive to take a case to court 
pleading that a piece of legislation is unconstitutional is lessened. After all the time spent 
and money invested in the judicial process, the executive can come along and simply 
reverse the decision. Such a fact could result in the constitutional review process failing 
entirely, as individuals may no longer see the point of bringing constitutional review 
cases to court if they can simply be overridden. Due to the threat of override, it arguably 
makes the whole constitutional review process completely pointless. 
 
B Absolute Veto of Constitutionally Consequential Legislation 
 
The second proposed constitutional review mechanism is another adaptation of the US 
president’s veto power. As explained above, the US president can veto a piece of 
legislation. This power exists for a number of purposes, one being to ensure that the 
legislature does not pass legislation contrary to the executive branch’s policies. What this 
adaptation of the veto power would focus on is not ordinary legislation but legislation 
with constitutional consequences.  While the current two thirds majority in both houses 
would still override a presidential veto in regards to a veto of ordinary legislation, this 
paper proposes a constitutional review mechanism which holds that if a president vetoes a 
piece of legislation of constitutional importance, then the legislature is unable to override 
the veto. The legal consequence would be similar to the current result in the US system 
where a court strikes down a piece of legislation. Where, in the president’s opinion, a 
piece of legislation breaches constitutional norms, he or she would be able to veto that 
piece of legislation, making the statute legally ineffective. The mechanism would require 
what often occurs when presidential vetoes occur; reasons for the veto. If the reason for 
the veto was the breach of constitutional norms, then that veto of legislation would not be 
afforded the usual override possibility of a two-thirds majority in congress. Constitutional 
amendments would likely be deemed to be pieces of legislation of constitutional 
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consequence, so while the legislature could pass these pieces of legislation, they would be 
subject to potential veto by the president’s veto power.  
 
The issue of democratic legitimacy is tricky when applied to this potential constitutional 
review mechanism. This is because we have a conflict between two democratic 
institutions. The legislature is made up of democratic representatives, but the head of the 
executive is also democratically elected. On one hand we have a democratic legislature 
who decides a piece of legislation is constitutionally complaint, and on the other hand we 
have the democratically elected president or prime minister who states that the legislation 
is not constitutionally compliant. The current US veto power seems to address this 
democratic issue by requiring a two-thirds majority vote in the legislature to override the 
Presidential veto. In this way, the more democratic mechanism trumps the less 
democratic mechanism. However, both the passing of legislation and the electing of a 
president or prime minister only require a mere majority. If the executive’s decision 
under the proposed mechanism will trump the legislatures and both institutions are 
equally democratic, then how can this democratic conflict be resolved? The answer is by 
simply broadening the scope of what we are comparing. This paper is presenting 
substitutes for the democratically illegitimate decision making process, judicial review. 
Placed alongside judicial review, the internal democratic issue can be overlooked. The 
tension between the executive and legislature doesn’t matter, as an executive having the 
final decision of constitutional compliance is obviously superior to the courts when 
analysing both mechanisms from a democratic point of view. Because of this, the 
executive power of an absolute veto of constitutionally consequential legislation can be 
expressed as having relative democratic legitimacy.  
 
While the opportunity for this review function to degenerate into absolute parliamentary 
sovereignty exists, it is less likely to occur that the weak form review mechanisms 
described. Degeneration could potentially occur if the veto power was never used. The 
mechanism give the head of the executive the power to veto legislation, but creates no 
obligation on him or her to use such a power when unconstitutional legislation is passed. 
What differentiates this mechanism from weak form review mechanisms described earlier 
is the fact that the executive is a political body, while the courts are not. If a court does 
not react the passing of an unconstitutional piece of legislation, public pressure is of little 
consequence. The judiciary, being an independent body, has little to no interest in the 
opinions of average citizens. The executive responds differently to public pressure. Being 
a political body, public pressure is of much more consequence and pressure being 
directed towards the executive cannot be so readily ignored. There is no political cost if a 
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judiciary refuses to strike down legislation. There is a potential political cost to the 
executive however if it constantly refuses to use its veto power for legislation that, in the 
opinion of the public, is unconstitutional. The political backlash is something the 
executive would likely take into account when deciding whether to veto legislation and 
due to this potential public pressure it would be unlikely that the veto power would never 
be exercised. 
 
Evolution into effective strong form review is not possible. Strong form review, being a 
mechanism where the courts strike down democratically elected pieces of legislation, 
cannot exist for a very simple reason. The court under this mechanism would not have 
such a power. Instead, it is the executive who has the power to strike down legislation. 
While it is arguable that strong form review could be expanded to include any body who 
has the final power to strike down democratically enacted legislation, what this paper 
means by strong form review is the judicial review of legislation by democratically 
illegitimate courts. Accepting this definition, effective evolution into strong form review 
is not possible.  
 
The function of this mechanism is slightly different from that of the executive override of 
judicial decisions. Under that proposed mechanism, what occurs is the executive makes 
valid what would otherwise be invalid legislation. They return legislation to legal 
effectiveness through the override of the judicial decision that struck down the 
legislation. Under the absolute veto of constitutionally consequential legislation, the 
opposite can be said to occur. What occurs under this proposed mechanism is that the 
executive is making invalid otherwise valid legislation through the use of the veto power. 
They make legislation legally ineffective. This difference may seem significant, however 
it is arguably not of any importance. Looking wider at what is occurring under these two 
constitutional review mechanisms, what we have is simply a mechanism that allows a 
decision to be made by the executive as to whether a piece of legislation is 
constitutionally compliant. If the legislation is constitutionally compliant according to the 
executive, then the legislation is effective. Under the first mechanism, the statute will be 
returned to legal effectiveness. Under the second mechanism, the veto power will not be 
used and the legislation will remain effective. If the legislation is not constitutionally 
compliant according to the executive, then the legislation will be ineffective. Under the 
first mechanism, the legislation would not returned to legal effectiveness by use of the 
executive override. Under the second mechanism, the legislation would be vetoed. The 
difference of whether a power involves invalidation or validation of legislation is 
arguably irrelevant due to the fact that the use or non-use of both types of powers offers 
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the same results when an executive is making a decision about constitutional compliance. 
In simple terms, non-use of an invalidation power equates to validation and non-use of a 
validation power equates to invalidation. 
1 Problems with Absolute Veto of Constitutionally Consequential Legislation 
 
The most obvious issue with this proposed mechanism is what is meant when a piece of 
legislation is ‘constitutionally consequential.’ The difference between what is ordinary 
legislation and what is constitutionally consequential is of great significance as the 
former can be overridden by the legislature, but the latter cannot. This makes the 
definition of utmost importance. Such a problem can prima facie be solved quite easily by 
saying that constitutionally consequential legislation are statutes that affect constitutional 
norms. This however raises an equally important problem. Who decides whether 
legislation affects constitutional norms? If it is the President or Prime Minister making 
this decision, the potential for abuse is enormous. The head of the executive could declare 
legislation that is in fact ordinary to be constitutionally consequential and use this reason 
to veto the legislation so that the override power of the legislature is unable to be used. If 
a President or Prime Minister was going to go to the trouble of vetoing a piece of 
legislation, it is clear that it is not their intention to have it reenacted by the legislature 
override. Therefore there is no reason in which the president or prime minister would not 
state that the legislation was constitutionally consequential, assuming of course this 
decision was theirs to make. While such a decision of whether legislation is 
constitutionally consequential could in theory be subject to administrative law, this 
doctrine relies in a large degree on notions of reasonableness, which is a difficult concept 
at the best of times. 
 
This proposed mechanism is also limited in the amount of states in which it can be 
applied to. In a Westminster style state, the head of the political party who has a majority 
of seats in the legislature is also the head of the executive branch. The “nearly complete 
fusion of the legislative and executive powers”63 results in an overlap between the 
legislative making process of a Westminster style state. The issue that exists under this 
proposed constitutional review mechanism is that the executive is reviewing statutes 
made by the legislature. Arguably however, stripping away the separation of powers 
fallacy, the executive is part of the legislature. In a Westminster style state, what would 
be occurring when the proposed mechanism was being employed would be a review of 
legislation by the party that made the legislation. Any successful veto would mean a 
  
63 Walter Bagehot The English Constitution (1st ed, Virtue and Co., London, 1867) at 65. 
28  300163164 
 
political party disagreeing with legislation that it passed into law itself. The result is 
absurd and the only way in which this proposed review function could operate effectively 
is in a U.S. style system where the executive branch is separate and distinct from the 
legislative branch. 
 
C Executive Mandate for Judicial Intervention 
 
The final proposed constitutional review mechanism is an adaptation of New Zealand 
section 7 report procedure. The proposed process can be best understood by first 
explaining the current reporting procedure under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.64 
Section 7 states that where a bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the 
Attorney General shall bring to the attention to the House any provision in the Bill which 
appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act.65 Under the Standing Orders of the House, the Attorney 
general must present a section 7 report as a parliamentary paper and is encouraged to 
explain why a provision infringes the Bill of Rights.66 The report is merely informative 
and has no legal consequence. Basically, the section demands that the Attorney General 
asses all Bills and present a report when, in the Attorney General’s opinion, a bill is 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
 
The adaptation that this paper proposes is a combination of this procedure and strong 
form review. How the mechanism would operate is that before a bill passes into 
legislation, the bill will be assessed by a specified person within executive branch, in a 
similar fashion as New Zealand, to determine whether the bill is compliant with 
constitutional norms. The scope of the inquiry would be greater as all norms of a 
country’s constitutional make up would be assessed, not merely rights declared in a bill 
of rights. A report would be produced as to the compliance of the bill, indicating whether 
specific sections and the bill as a whole will be constitutionally compliant if passed into 
law. In addition to the report, the judiciary would have a US style strong form review 
power. They would be given the constitutional power to strike down legislation, but 
would only be able to exercise this power on sections or statutes in which the executive 
had previously deemed to breach constitutional norms. In the absence of legislation’s 
  
64 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
65 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s7. 
66 Phillip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, Thomson Brookers, 
Wellington, 2007) at 1173. 
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inclusion in a negative report, the judiciary would not have the ability to strike down the 
legislation and would merely have the power to make a declaration of incompatibility.  
 
The judiciary could choose whether or not to invalidate a piece of legislation if the 
legislation was included in a negative report. Situations may occur when pieces of 
legislation affect the constitutional rights of citizens. However, just because a statute or 
section is included in a negative report doesn’t mean it should automatically be struck 
down. The judiciary still has an important role in the constitutional review process. An 
inclusion on a negative report means that the executive is of the opinion that the statute or 
section breaches constitutional norms. But when an individual case is brought to the 
judiciary, the inquiry isn’t that simple. Let’s say a statute has the potential to take 
property rights. In the executive’s opinion, this would be unconstitutional and the section 
is included in a negative report. Let’s now say a person has had their property right taken 
by the legislation. The inquiry is not merely whether the courts think the taking of 
property rights breaches constitutional norms and if this is so, then the legislation should 
be struck down. Instead, the court is looking at a fact specific situation, including factors 
such as rights balancing, the statutory purpose of the legislation, case law, expanding or 
contracting legal definitions and countless other important legal factors specific to the 
case presented. While a section may very well deserve to be included in a negative report, 
it does not mean that any fact scenario brought before the judiciary warrants an 
invalidation of the legislation. Due to this, the courts role in this constitutional review 
mechanism is still very important. 
 
The legitimacy of this decision making process has two layers. Prima facie, it appears 
that such a mechanism would be as democratically illegitimate as regular strong form 
review. An unelected judiciary is striking down democratically enacted legislation. 
However, by looking a layer deeper, it is clear that the decision making process does in 
fact have democratically legitimacy. The judicial striking down of legislation can only be 
made after a democratic body has made a decision on a pre-enacted piece of legislation’s 
constitutional compliance. In this way, a judiciary cannot be said to be making the 
decision that the legislation is unconstitutional. What they are in effect doing is agreeing 
with the democratic decision of the executive and giving that decision legal effect once a 
specific issue of the legislation comes to existence. Judicial decision-making is 
democratically illegitimate because the people making such a decision are unelected and 
not accountable. The executive however is a democratic construct, elected by a majority 
and accountable to citizens. It is this feature of this constitutional review mechanism that 
gives the decision-making process legitimacy. 
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An executive mandate for judicial intervention is unlikely to degenerate into absolute 
parliamentary sovereignty. What exists under this proposal is a system where the 
judiciary has a qualified supremacy. It is the final ‘decider’ on constitutional 
disagreements, provided that the executive agrees with such a decision prior. 
Degeneration could occur if the executive never finds any problems of constitutional 
compliance within proposed legislation. While this is an ideal situation, it is unlikely to 
occur. Laws passed by legislatures frequently affect rights and often do so inadvertently. 
It would be difficult to argue that this would suddenly change by an introduction of the 
proposed review process. Degeneration could also occur if the judiciary routinely decides 
to not strike down legislation that has been deemed to be unconstitutional by the 
executive. Such an event is extremely unlikely. It is difficult to think of a reason in which 
a court, which has the power to strike down an unconstitutional piece of legislation and 
has the mandate to do so, would always decide that legislation should stand. Of course, it 
could be that in the courts opinion all legislation is constitutional or that, as explained 
above, the fact specific inquiry by the courts does not result in the legislation being 
deemed unconstitutional. But can this realistically be likely to occur in every 
constitutional disagreement bought to the courts, especially if the executive is routinely 
releasing negative reports of legislation’s constitutional compliance? One reason why the 
courts may refuse to strike down unconstitutional legislation is that they do not want to 
interfere with government policy. They may decide that it is better for them not to strike 
down legislation due to their lack of expertise in policy creation. This argument however 
sits on weak foundations. It is the executive that makes policy. If the executive has 
already indicated in a negative report that legislation is unconstitutional, then surely 
agreeing with the executive and striking down the legislation is the same as deferring to 
the executive. How can agreeing with the policy maker be an unreasonable intrusion in 
policy creation? Degeneration to absolute parliamentary sovereignty would require the 
courts to ignore issues in which they have the power and the mandate to solve.  
 
Evolution into effective strong form review is not possible under this proposed 
mechanism. Effective strong form review relies on the judiciary having the effective final 
say in a constitutional disagreement. This cannot happen with an executive mandate for 
judicial intervention. Courts are only able to strike down legislation, and present their 
effective decision on constitutional non-compliance of statutes, when the executive allows 
them to do so. In the absence of such an allowance, the judiciary has no right to strike 
down legislation. In this way, the evolution into a system where judiciaries can strike 
down any unconstitutional piece of legislation is impossible.  
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1 Problems with Executive Mandate of Judicial Intervention 
 
 
This proposed constitutional review mechanism has one major issue. The process centers 
on a report produced by the executive that outlines which sections and bills are 
constitutionally non-compliant and allow the court the power to strike down these pieces 
of legislation. But who will produce these reports? In New Zealand, the Attorney General 
prepares the report that indicates a breach of the Bill of Rights Act.67 The Attorney 
General is a cabinet Minster, but by convention must exercise independent judgment in 
the public interest.68 The Prime Minister appoints cabinet ministers; they themselves are 
not elected into the position of Attorney General. Therein lies the problem. The ideal 
review process is one that has democratic legitimacy. Strong form does not fit in this 
framework due to the fact that the judges of the judiciary who are making the 
constitutional decisions are not democratically elected. The same issue exists with this 
review function. It is essentially an unelected person who takes the role of decision maker 
of whether legislation is constitutionally compliant, the same problem that make strong 
form review unfavorable.  
 
Giving the report making power to the head of the executive can potentially solve the 
issue. A democratically elected Prime Minister would not have the appointment issues 
that face the Attorney General. Unfortunately, the issue is not so easily resolved.  Giving 
the report making power to the Prime Minister in a Westminster system would have the 
same issues that face the absolute veto of constitutionally consequential legislation. The 
overlap between the executive and the legislature would undoubtedly result a lack of 
negative reports. It is difficult to understand why legislation which the majority of 
parliament wants passed would be placed on a negative report by same political party 
who wants the legislation to be effective. It is further difficult to understand why the 
Prime Minister, the head of the majority party in parliament, would push a piece of 
legislation but give the opportunity for the legislation to be struck down, when it can just 
as easily take the opportunity to be struck down away by simply omitting it from a 
negative report. The conflict of interest created between the role of creating legislation 
and deciding whether legislation is constitutionally compliant has the potential to 
undermine the constitutional review function if the power is given to a prime minister.  
  
67 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
68 Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, above n 66, at 242. 
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D The Tyranny of the Majority  
 
While the above described constitutional review mechanisms prima facie solve the 
problem of a democratically legitimate review function that is likely to remain stable, 
they are not without issues of their own. It is useful to take a step back and look at the 
nature of the review function that is proposed, being one which is founded in democratic 
principles. The problem described below would apply to all the proposed constitutional 
review mechanisms.  
 
The main problem of a democratic review function is that it creates the risk of a tyranny 
of the majority. Although democracy and democratic principles have large benefits for 
society, the nature of the majority system is that justice for minorities can be prevented 
when the majority chooses to restrict their rights.69 This issue has been raised my many 
legal philosophers, including James Madison who said, “If a majority be united by a 
common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”70 The above review 
proposals, in the forms described, all leave the final decision of constitutional compliance 
in the hands of the executive. The executive organ is a democratic organ and each of the 
proposed review functions has the possibility of subverting minority rights for the interest 
of the majority. With the theory of democracy central to the review function, the risk of a 
constitutional democracy collapsing into a tyrannical majority is a real possibility. 
 
This risk is one of the major reasons for having strong form judicial review. The power of 
judicial review has long been associated with the premise that the court stands as a 
guarantor of rights, protecting political minorities’ fundamental freedoms from attacks by 
the majority elected branches of government.71 By imposing one of the proposed 
mechanisms in place of strong form judicial review, the role of the courts will be changed 
dramatically by the fact that they will not have a strong form power, and thereby cannot 
protect minority rights. The tension seems unresolvable. A potential solution will be 
discussed in section VII of this paper, but for now it seems that either there exists a 
system that is democratic but risks breaching minority rights or there exists a system that 
protects minority rights but lacks democratic legitimacy. This fundamental issue prima 
facie lies within all of the proposed constitutional review functions.  
  
69
 Barbara J. Cox “"The Tyranny Of The Majority Is No Myth": Its Dangers For Same-Sex Couples” 
(2012) 34 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 235 at 243. 
70 James Madison “The Federalist No. 51” (1788). 
71 Linda Camp Keith The U.S. Supreme Court and the Judicial Review of Congress: Two Hundred Years in 
Exercise of the Courts Most Potent Power (1st ed, Peter Lang Publishing Inc, New York, 2008) at 117. 
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VII Defence of the Executive Mandate for Judicial Intervention 
 
None of the proposed constitutional review mechanisms are perfect. However, it is not 
perfection that is being sought. What is being sought is a democratically legitimate 
constitutional review function that is likely to remain stable. It is the argument of this 
paper that the executive mandate for judicial intervention best accomplishes this goal. 
Before presenting these explanations however, it is useful to take a step back and firstly 
defend the concept that is being put forward, democratically legitimate constitutional 
review. The biggest issue with this concept is the risk of the tyranny of the majority, but 
for reasons stated below, it is clear that this issue is likely overstated and conceptually 
tenuous. 
 
A Why the Tyranny of the Majority is a Non-Issue 
 
The concept of the tyranny of the majority is the greatest reason for having strong form 
judicial review and for taking democratic principles out of the constitutional review 
process. The supposed risk to the minority is too great when a majority has the power to 
subvert minority rights. But is this actually the case? While constitutional rights, 
including minority rights, are essential to any society, it does not follow that anything like 
strong form review is necessary to preserve constitutional rights.72 Looking outside the 
U.S., where strong form review works to stop the supposed tyranny of the majority, it is 
pretty clear that constitutional democracies can persist and preserve constitutional rights 
without strong judicial review or anything like it.73 Putting the argument another way, if 
the tyranny of the majority was such a large risk then surely states that did not have a 
strong form mechanism to prevent the realisation the risk would be face large 
majoritarian tyranny and subdued minority rights. It is doubtful whether this exists in 
reality, where democracies around the world are expanding minority rights, for example, 
the right to homosexual marriage.74 Neither strong form judicial review, nor anything like 
it is necessary or sufficient to constitutional democracy and while the tyranny of the 
majority may exist in theory, it is greatly overstated.75  
  
72 David A. Reid On the Philosophy of Law (1st ed, Thomson Wadsworth, Belmont, 2007) at 124. 
73 At 124. 
74 Marriage Amendment Act 2013 (New Zealand), Civil Marriage Act 2005 (Canada), Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2013 (UK), also democratic legislation passed in Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, 
France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay. 
75 Reid On the Philosophy of Law, above n 72, at 127. 
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In addition to the reality-based argument sated above, Waldron argues that the common 
argument of majoritarian tyranny is seriously confused.76 We can assume that tyranny is 
what happens to someone when his or her rights are denied.77 The first thing to realise 
about this definition, according to Waldron, is that potential tyranny is going to be at 
stake in any disagreement about rights. When a rights disagreement occurs, it is clear that 
the party in favor of a wider, more expansive understanding of the right will think that the 
opposite side’s position is potentially tyrannical.78 For example, defenders of euthanasia 
rights would think that the position of euthanasia illegality is tyrannical to the sick or 
elderly wishing to be euthanised. Democratic institutions are not perfect and will 
sometimes reach and enforce incorrect decisions about rights.79 Based on the above 
definition, they will act tyrannically. But, importantly, so too will courts. A decision 
made by either organ can deny someone rights and be expressed as tyranny. So then if we 
accept that both bodies can be potentially tyrannous, what makes tyranny of the majority 
so bad? Why is a decision aggravated by the fact that a majority imposes it? Put another 
way; is tyranny by a popular majority (e.g. a majority of elected representative, supported 
by a majority of his constituents) a particularly egregious form of tyranny?80 Waldron is 
unable to see how this is so. His view is that that you can either say tyranny is tyranny, 
irrespective of how the decision is made or, if how the decision is made is relevant to the 
question of tyranny, then the fact that it is made through a majoritarian process actually 
mitigates the tyranny. It does this because there is at least one non-tyrannical thing about 
the decision, as it was not made in a way that excluded certain people from participation 
as equals.81 
 
Based on these two points, the overstated nature of the tyranny of the majority and the 
theoretic confusion that the concept has when assessed from a constitutional review basis, 
the paper argue that the potential threat of tyranny by a democratically legitimate 
constitutional review mechanism will be of little consequence.  
 
 
 
  
76 Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review”, above n 8, at 1395. 
77 At 1395. 
78 At 1395. 
79 At 1396. 
80 At 1396. 
81 At 1396. 
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B Resolving the ‘Who’ Issue 
 
The biggest issue with the constitutional review function being defended, the executive 
mandate for judicial intervention, is who will be the person who is preparing the negative 
reports and how will they attain this position. As stated, the Attorney General would lack 
the democratic legitimacy required due to his or her undemocratic appointment. While 
democratic to a degree, as the appointment comes from a democratically elected prime 
minister or president, this person succumbs to the very same legitimacy issues that face 
judges. The head of the executive themselves is also arguably not the person to place this 
power with. The reason why is because, although they fully satisfy the democratic 
legitimacy requirement of the ideal constitutional review function, their review of the 
legislation is potentially subject to a conflict of interest. The head of the executive, when 
preparing these negative reports, will have other concerns that weigh in the decision, the 
biggest being public policy.  
 
How then can this be resolved? The answer is actually quite simply. A new role can be 
created, within the executive, where a person’s sole job is to fulfill this report-making 
function. The person would be democratically elected into this position. What would be 
different with this democratic position compared with a democratically elected judiciary, 
which would solve all the legitimacy issues of strong form judicial review, is the limited 
function that this person would have. A judge exists to settle legal disputes across all 
areas of law. It would be difficult for a person running for a position as judge to state to 
potential voters his or her stance on the almost infinite legal disputes which he or she 
would face. This report making position however operates within a much narrower 
framework. It is much easier for a person running for this position to state his or her 
position on a limited number of constitutional issues. The smaller amount of potential 
issues face by this role compared to that of a judge means that democratic election into 
this type of role is feasible while a democratically elected judiciary is arguably not.  
 
It is helpful to pause at this moment and negate any potential criticisms that may attach to 
this resolution. The most obvious is how is this person to be elected? The person can be 
elected merely by the inclusion of the role and candidates in a general election. 
Alternatively, the role could have a completely separate election. While this may seem 
like a difficult and costly exercise, that doesn’t mean it should not be done. The U.S. is a 
prime example of this, where their presidential elections are completely separate to the 
elections of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The presidential election 
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system could be said to be a difficult, costly and even an overly complex process. 
However none of these reasons mean that the method is a bad one. 
 
The creation of this role and the democratic nature that it holds succeeds to a great degree 
in accomplishing the ideal constitutional review process. The person has a certain level of 
independence and lack of potential conflict of interests when performing the report 
making function, meaning that constitutional review element of the process is achieved to 
the highest degree. The democratic nature of the position means that the decisions this 
person reaches have legitimacy. 
 
 
C Executive Mandate for Judicial Intervention as the Dominant Proposed 
Mechanism 
 
This paper holds that all three proposed forms of constitutional review would accomplish 
the goal of a democratically legitimate constitutional review function. However, the 
executive mandate for judicial intervention is the best form proposed. This is so for three 
reasons; the executive mandate offers a more evenly balanced distribution of 
constitutional power, it offers a collaborative rather than combative result and is a better 
potential exercise of the will of the people. These reasons and associated concepts are 
explained below.  
 
1 Balanced Distribution of Power 
 
An executive mandate for judicial intervention takes proposed legislation, reports on 
whether it is constitutionally compliant, allows the legislation to be passed regardless of 
what the report says, but allows the future striking down of legislation by the courts if 
previously subject to a negative report. In short, this approach places the legislative 
making power in the legislature, an allowance making power in the executive, and a final 
interpretation power in the courts. Each organ is given power, but is subject to a 
restriction that stops that power from being supreme. The entire point of 
constitutionalism, and constitutional review, is to place restrictions on the powers that 
government organs have to maintain the social contract that the people agreed to at the 
time a constitution is made. Constitutionalism keeps the government organs from 
extending their powers to become potentially oppressive. Taking parliamentary 
sovereignty and judicial supremacy as examples of the two extremes that can be 
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potentially reached, it is clear that under either of these two theories, and in the absence 
of any constitutional amendment, a body exists which has the constitutional power to 
subject the other organs to its whim. The executive mandate disallows this potential 
abuse of power, by facilitating power sharing where each branch is responsible to 
another. 
 
While the executive veto of judicial decisions and absolute veto of constitutionally 
consequential legislation are good in that they redistribute power traditionally held by the 
legislature and judiciary, their failure is that they arguably go too far in that distribution. 
Both of these proposed forms of constitutional review place a full and final decision-
making power in the hands of the executive. While this paper would argue this is a 
potentially good thing, due to the democratic nature of the executive, it is arguable that 
this absolute supremacy held by the executive goes too far in redistributing traditional 
constitutional review power. Allowing one organ, by itself, to make an unrestricted 
decision on constitutional compliance can potentially result in the exact type of 
oppressive behavior that constitutionalism is attempting to combat.  
 
2 Complimentary Rather Than Combative 
 
Constitutional review will always involve a tension. On the one hand we have someone 
relying on a piece of legislation, saying that either the legislation does not in their opinion 
infringe constitutional values or that it does so but is necessary or reasonable. On the 
other hand we have another person who is saying that the legislation does infringe 
constitutional values. The decision of whether the legislation breaches constitutional 
norms can be made in many ways. At one extreme, parliament could say that no other 
organ can inquire at all into whether a piece of legislation is consistent with constitutional 
norms. This is in effect saying that the decision of adherence to constitutional norms will 
be made only by parliament. At the other extreme, the judiciary can say that any piece of 
law that affects constitutional norms will be struck down. This is saying that the judiciary 
can only make the decision of adherence to constitutional norms. In assessing 
constitutional review as simply a decision and by understanding that the decision can be 
placed somewhere on a scale between parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy, 
there are two frameworks in which a constitutional review decision can be seen through.  
 
Firstly, a decision could be combative. What this means is that the government organs are 
working against each other to try to achieve their respective goals. For parliament this 
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will mean the legislation they pass having legal effect and for the judiciary this will mean 
not enforcing legislation that breaches constitutional norms. Strong form judicial review 
is a perfect example of a combative constitutional review mechanism, as the judiciary has 
the final say on whether legislation breaches constitutional norms and whether the 
legislation will be enforced. It fully considers its own goals and places these before 
parliaments policy objectives. Absolute parliamentary sovereignty is another example of 
a combative constitutional review mechanism. There, parliament is not taking the court’s 
opinions into account and merely pursuing with their own legislative interests.  
 
Alternatively, a decision could be complimentary. This type of decision can be best 
described as falling somewhere in the middle of the scale described earlier. It is neither 
parliament demonstrating its sovereignty nor the judiciary demonstrating its supremacy, 
but instead it is a middle ground between the two opposing forces. What this type of 
decision does is best understood as a form of legislative dialogue. It is the government 
organs informing the parliament of any constitutional violations that legislation does in a 
productive way to try to meet a balance between the policy objectives of the legislation 
and adherence to constitutional norms. 
 
The executive mandate is a perfect example of this arguably superior complimentary 
constitutional review mechanism. It is a mechanism that operates between parliamentary 
sovereignty and judicial supremacy with the goal of having constitutionally compliant 
legislation. It offers the executive to function as a middleman for the tension created 
between the judiciary and legislature to operate as an informer of legislation’s 
constitutional compliance and strips away the legislature versus judiciary notion 
traditionally attached to constitutional review. The other two proposed methods of 
constitutional review unfortunately are likely to be combative forms. The executive 
override of judicial decisions and absolute veto of constitutionally consequential 
legislation both result in the executive branch having the full and final say in a 
constitutional disagreement. Both of these forms create a new doctrine, executive 
supremacy, and create the exact type of combative tension mentioned above. Because of 
the nature of an override or a veto, the executive can be said to be working against either 
the judiciary or parliament in an attempt to achieve its goals. In the same way as strong 
form judicial review, these methods consider the executive’s goals and places them 
before the goals of either the judiciary or parliament. The executive mandate does not 
result in the same type of combative constitutional review and for this reason can be said 
to be more satisfactory that the other two proposed mechanisms. 
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3 An Exercise of the “Will of the People” 
 
Taking a step back from the specifics of the proposed constitutional review, it is helpful 
to look at the concept of constitutional review and what it means when a specific 
constitutional review process is adopted. Any constitutional review process is an attempt 
to maintain the current constitutional system and norms that citizens have agreed to. It 
does this by disallowing the legislature to breach constitutional norms when it passes 
legislation. By creating boundaries for what parliament can legislate on, the initial social 
contract entered between the people and the state is upheld. For example, constitutional 
review would likely deem that the abolishment of the judiciary, in a modern democratic 
state, as unconstitutional. In this way, the people of the nation are saying that the 
abolishment of the courts is not what they agreed upon when they gave the state the 
power to govern them. The agreement between people and the state of what powers the 
state has and how these powers may be exercised is of critical importance when inquiring 
into issues relating to constitutional review.  
 
As we have seen, constitutional review processes have the potential to evolve into 
judicial supremacy or degenerate into parliamentary sovereignty. The crucial issue here is 
that when this evolution or degeneration occurs, it is not done after consultation with the 
people of the state. What exists is an evolution or degeneration that citizens have not 
agreed to. While the legal powers themselves are not changed, the effective nature of how 
the state exercises these powers have changed. What this means is that when 
degeneration or evolution of constitutional review procedures occurs, we have a power 
being exercised by the state that was not agreed to by the people. For example, if in the 
UK declarations of inconsistency were adopted by parliament word for word and wide 
judicial interpretation were not corrected, we would have the final decision making being 
made by the courts, where the people agreed that these decisions should not be made by 
the courts, but they should instead be made by parliament.  
 
Constitutional amendment as a potential remedy for incorrect use of state power always 
exists, however amendments arguably will not fix the issue. The issue isn’t with the 
power created, but rather with how the organs use the power. Taking the Canadian 
situation of evolution into effective strong form review as an example, it is difficult to 
think how a constitutional amendment could result in parliament beginning to use the 
notwithstanding clause when it is appropriate to do so. Assuming that constitutional 
amendments cannot return constitutional review procedures which have evolved or 
degenerated back to the procedure that was originally agreed to by the people, then it 
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seem to be that the only way to ensure the social contract is upheld is by having a 
constitutional review system which cannot, or is at least the most unlikely to, evolve or 
degenerate. This is again where the executive mandate for judicial intervention dominates 
the other proposed mechanisms.  
 
The executive mandate for judicial intervention is the least likely mechanism to 
degenerate or evolve and as a result is the best constitutional review mechanism for 
maintaining the social contract entered into between people and the state. As stated above 
in section VI, the role of the courts and the unlikeliness that zero constitutional 
incompatibilities would be found in proposed legislation means that the chance of 
degeneration into parliamentary sovereignty is very low. Evolution into strong form is not 
possible. The other two proposed forms on the other hand place final decision-making 
power in the executive. As in Canada, there is no way to determine whether they will be 
used or not. Because of this, the stability of the mechanism is completely reliant on how 
the procedure will operate in practice. What is attempting to be reached is the creation of 
a constitutional review mechanism to limit state power, agreed to by the people. However 
if the state can alter the mechanism through extra legal means, such as non-use of the 
power, then such a mechanism cannot be said to be satisfactory. Due to the fact that the 
executive mandate for judicial intervention has the least likely chance to degenerate or 
evolve, it best satisfies the goal of upholding the constitutional review mechanism agreed 
to by the people when a social contract was entered into between these people and that 
state. 
 
 
VIII Conclusion 
 
The issue this paper dealt with was the democratic illegitimacy of the US style judicial 
review procedure. We saw that having unelected judges making decisions that affected 
individual’s constitutional rights was a problem due to the fact that these people were 
unelected, completely independent and unaccountable. Weak form constitution review, 
seen through procedures adopted in New Zealand, the UK and Canada, all attempted to 
solve the democratic illegitimacy issues by setting up respective systems that sees 
parliament as the final decision maker of constitutional disagreements. However, these 
systems are not without issues of their own and it was apparent that weak form judicial 
review mechanisms has the potential to evolve into effective strong form judicial review 
or degenerate into absolute parliamentary sovereignty. The issue then became how to 
ensure democratically legitimate constitutional review that would be stable in the long 
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term. The paper introduced the executive branch as a possible solution. By proposing 
three constitutional review processes that held the executive as central importance, the 
paper attempted to create a constitutional review process that upheld democratic 
principles and would likely be stable. An executive override of judicial decisions, a 
executive veto of constitutionally consequential legislation and an executive mandate for 
judicial intervention where the three proposed mechanisms, each prima facie solving both 
democratic legitimacy and stability issues with current forms of constitutional review. 
The executive mandate for judicial intervention was the best proposed mechanism, due to 
the fact that it best distributed appropriate power between the different government 
organs, was a mechanism which was inherently complimentary rather than combative 
and, lastly, was the most likely to respect the will of the people by its stable nature and 
relative incapability to degenerate or evolve into a system not agreed to by a state’s 
citizens. As the US constitution says, it is the people that should decide how they are 
governed and the constitutional norms that their society holds. The judiciary having this 
power is illegitimate and the dominant proposed constitutional review mechanism would 
return this power to the people. 
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